By Cláudio Puty (UFPA/CFC-GS)
Many assessments of COP30 in Belém have already been made, and there seems to be relatively broad recognition that something important happened there: the vibrant presence of civil society, the strength of indigenous voices, social diversity occupying a democratic space, and this, in itself, is not trivial.
Still, the decisions fell far short of what the planet needs. There is recognition of the problem, but a disconcerting timidity in the responses. The case of fossil fuels is emblematic, and insufficient adherence to climate finance targets on the scale needed only reinforces the diagnosis.
Many people will argue that COP has an insoluble structural problem because it does not address the foundations of industrial society, especially its hyper-financialized phase.
This is true.
But for me, the problem is not the COP itself, but rather the constituent power of the institutions and governments that comprise it. The conference is a political mirror, not a transformative oracle.
I believe that, amid a global scenario of political regression, growing authoritarianism, and questioning of the very idea of democracy, the existence of a multilateral space, legitimate for the vast majority of countries (with the important, and perhaps fatal, absence of Trump’s US), is something to be valued. In such dark times, bringing together so many people concerned about the future of humanity (even if some are primarily concerned about their profits) should, if not celebrated, at least be recognized.
A key point in explaining the weakness of the proposals is not, as some have suggested, the consensus decision-making mechanism. The issue is another: the correlation of forces among the major emitters. The US not only stayed away, but treated the COP as futile and counterproductive, while accelerating its oil drive and threatening military intervention in Venezuela.
The European Union, under political and economic pressure, arrived in Belém having approved a less ambitious climate target for 2040, reducing the goal to around an 85% cut compared to 1990, with the possibility of external compensation.
It is difficult to sustain the narrative of climate leadership under these conditions.
China and the BAM
China, currently the largest gross emitter, deserves a separate chapter.
It arrived in Belém with one of the largest national delegations, which obviously signals the political weight attributed to the event.
The team was led by Li Gao, Deputy Minister of Ecology and Environment, a central figure in Chinese climate diplomacy. At his side, Xia Yingxian, an experienced negotiator known for leading sensitive debates, especially on language related to fossil fuels, played a prominent role.
Wang Yi, an academic and diplomat with strong intellectual influence on Beijing’s climate policy, was the voice responsible for reiterating the strategic message that China would not “lead alone” in increasing global ambition. At the same time, Deputy Prime Minister Ding Xuexiang held high-level meetings with the Brazilian government before and during the conference, reinforcing the geopolitical dimension of the relationship and the commitment to technological and energy cooperation.
Despite this robust presence, China’s stance was deliberately cautious: constructive but defensive, seeking to ensure domestic flexibility, especially in the continued use of coal, while projecting technological leadership in solar, wind, batteries, and electric vehicles.
The debate on the Belém Action Mechanism (BAM) was perhaps the most interesting point. The mechanism was not formally included in the final text of the “Global Task Force,” but it was widely discussed, and the G77 + China made clear its support. For Beijing, supporting the BAM fulfills two strategic objectives: strengthening South-South cooperation and advocating for a climate architecture based on enabling conditions, such as financing, capacity building, and technology transfer, rather than mitigation obligations imposed on developing countries.
In short, China made policy with the Global South, and left it at that.
Finance at the crossroads
In the financial arena, which is central to the global transition, the agreements fell far short of what was needed.
The TFFF, the Tropical Forest Forever Fund, was one of the central elements of this agenda. Proposed by the Lula administration, it consolidates a diplomatic vision that Brazil had already been testing: treating tropical forests as global climate infrastructure, rather than as a peripheral domestic problem. It is an institutionally innovative initiative with the potential to reposition the country as a formulator, rather than just a demander, of climate solutions. It gained political support, international visibility, and formal recognition in the final text.
In addition, there were additional commitments from developed countries to strengthen funds for adaptation, mitigation, resilience, and just energy transition, as well as specific contributions to existing multilateral mechanisms.
Even so, these announcements were fragmented and largely insufficient given the scale of the climate crisis. The challenge remains the same: to transform intention into predictability, volume, and permanence. A central part of the so-called implementation roadmap.
The final text of COP30 recognizes the need to expand climate finance, strengthen existing instruments, and mobilize resources compatible with the 1.5°C trajectory. However, it avoids numbers, timelines, burden sharing, and distinctions between new and re-labeled resources.
In summary, COP30 was historic. Belém offered a powerful, symbolic, democratic setting, but our problems remain the same: comfortable consensus—everyone agrees that more money is needed, as long as no one has to foot the bill.
