By Douglas Alencar (UFPA/CFC-GS)
The global climate crisis has imposed on the international community the urgent need to establish financial cooperation mechanisms capable of enabling both the mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions and adaptation to the already observable impacts of climate change. In this context, the agreements established under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and, more recently, the Paris Agreement, determine that developed countries must mobilize financial resources to support developing countries in their transition toward a low-carbon economy that is resilient to climate impacts. This principle acknowledges common but differentiated responsibilities, recognizing that developed countries are historically the largest contributors to the accumulated emissions that have caused the current climate crisis.
Despite this formal recognition, progress in mobilizing resources remains limited and insufficient in the face of the magnitude of the challenges. The report from the fifth session of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement (CMA.5), held during COP28 in 2023, highlights that global climate finance needs are estimated at between USD 5.8 and 5.9 trillion by 2030. This amount is essential to enable mitigation and adaptation actions — far beyond the commitments previously agreed upon, such as the target of USD 100 billion per year by 2020, which, despite being modest compared to current demands, was not fully met.
The case of Brazil exemplifies these dynamics and challenges. Although Brazil does receive international financial support for climate action, the resources are highly concentrated among a few donors — mainly Norway, Germany, France, and, to a lesser extent, the United States — who were responsible for the majority of disbursements between 2011 and 2023. Nevertheless, the total volumes mobilized remain far below what is needed to address the challenges associated with preserving its biomes, promoting a clean energy matrix, and building a low-carbon economy. This scenario not only reflects the persistent asymmetries in the international climate finance regime but also underscores the urgent need to strengthen financial mechanisms that are predictable, sufficient, and accessible to developing countries as an essential condition for effectively addressing the climate crisis.
The agreements reached within the framework of the Conferences of the Parties (COPs) under the UNFCCC establish, as a fundamental principle, that developed countries must provide financial support to developing countries for both adaptation and mitigation efforts. This commitment stems from the acknowledgment of common but differentiated responsibilities, reflecting the fact that developed countries have historically contributed far more to the climate crisis and, therefore, should bear a greater share of the costs involved in the global transition to a low-carbon economy.
As discussed in previous analyses, this issue was once again central to the report of the fifth session of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement (CMA.5), held during COP28 in the United Arab Emirates between November 30 and December 13, 2023. Under the agenda item titled “Matters relating to the Standing Committee on Finance,” it became clear that the financial flows currently being mobilized fall far short of what is needed. The report itself stresses that the resources required to enable the global transition to a low-carbon economy are of an order of magnitude significantly higher than current commitments. Estimates indicate a global financing need of between USD 5.8 and 5.9 trillion by 2030, covering both mitigation — that is, emissions reduction — and adaptation, which involves preparing societies and economies for the already unavoidable effects of climate change.
Historically, developed countries committed, starting from COP15 in Copenhagen (2009), to jointly mobilize at least USD 100 billion per year by 2020 to support developing countries. However, this target was neither fully met by the deadline nor in subsequent years — for example, in 2021, the amount fell short of the goal. This failure not only undermines the credibility of international agreements but also jeopardizes the capacity of developing countries to implement their own transition and adaptation strategies, given the lack of sufficient domestic resources to tackle such complex challenges (source).
Additionally, the report shows that, specifically for adaptation, developing countries will need to mobilize between USD 215 and 387 billion per year by 2030. These resources are essential for protecting vulnerable populations against extreme weather events — such as droughts, floods, cyclones, and sea-level rise — which are already becoming more frequent and intense.
In the field of mitigation, the challenge is even greater. Financing for the expansion and consolidation of clean energy — including solar, wind, green hydrogen, and carbon capture technologies — must reach USD 4.3 trillion annually by 2030. Moreover, this figure must rise to USD 5 trillion per year by 2050 if the world is to remain on the path toward achieving net-zero emissions by mid-century, as established in the Paris Agreement.
Against this backdrop, the historical shortfall in meeting the USD 100 billion annual target casts serious doubt on the feasibility of reaching the financing levels now deemed necessary. In practice, there remains a lack of robust, binding, and automatic mechanisms to ensure that these resources are effectively mobilized and fairly channeled to developing countries. This further deepens the existing asymmetries in the international climate regime, where historical responsibilities are not proportionately translated into concrete financial commitments.
When it comes to the main international donors of climate finance to Brazil, a significant concentration of resources among a small group of countries is evident — even though the amounts remain far below what is truly needed to support the country’s mitigation and adaptation efforts. Between 2011 and 2023, Norway stood out as the single largest donor, accounting for an impressive 38% of all resources directed to Brazil during this period. This support is closely tied to Norway’s historical commitment to funding initiatives aimed at preserving the Amazon and combating deforestation, which are critical for both mitigation and adaptation.
Germany ranks as the second-largest donor, contributing 30% of the total transfers in the period. Germany’s contribution reflects a strong foreign policy in the environmental field, prioritizing strategic partnerships with countries of global environmental relevance — such as Brazil — particularly concerning forest protection, renewable energy development, and strengthening sustainability policies.
France follows in third place, accounting for 23% of the total resources allocated to Brazil between 2011 and 2023. French contributions similarly reflect the country’s commitment to the international climate agenda, combining technical cooperation, financing for energy transition projects, and support for environmental conservation efforts.
The United States ranks fourth, contributing 7% of the total resources directed to Brazil during the period analyzed. Despite being the world’s largest economy and one of the major historical greenhouse gas emitters, its contribution to Brazil’s climate finance remains relatively modest, especially when compared to European countries and Norway.
Finally, the combined contributions of all other countries amount to only 2% of the total accumulated between 2011 and 2023. This figure not only highlights the strong concentration of donations among a small group of countries but also underscores the inadequacy of international financial flows directed to Brazil in light of the magnitude of the country’s climate and environmental challenges.
In light of the challenges posed by the climate crisis, it becomes evident that the current international financing mechanisms are insufficient to meet the needs of developing countries — including Brazil — in implementing their mitigation and adaptation strategies. The historical failure to meet financing targets, combined with the high concentration of funds among a few donor countries, highlights the structural limitations of the international climate finance regime. Overcoming these limitations requires not only scaling up financial commitments but also creating more robust, predictable, and binding mechanisms capable of ensuring that the necessary financial flows are effectively channeled to support the transition to a low-carbon and climate-resilient economy — particularly in countries that, despite having contributed little to the origin of the problem, are among the most vulnerable to its impacts.
